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It is known that majority voting among several individuals on logically interconnected pro-
positions may generate irrational collective judgments. We generalize majority voting by
considering quota rules, which accept each proposition if and only if the number of indi-
viduals accepting it exceeds some (proposition-speciﬁc) threshold. After characterizing quota
rules, we prove necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which their outcomes satisfy various
rationality conditions. We also consider sequential quota rules, which adjudicate proposi-
tions sequentially, letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. While ensuring rational-
ity, sequential rules may be path-dependent. We characterize path-independence and prove
its equivalence to strategy-proofness under mild conditions. Our results generalize earlier
(im)possibility theorems. JEL Classiﬁcation Number: D71.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
How can a group of individuals make collective judgments on multiple logically con-
nected propositions based on the individuals’ judgments on these propositions? It is
natural for the group to take a majority vote on each proposition. But proposition-
wise majority voting does not guarantee ‘rational’ collective judgments, as a simple
example illustrates. Suppose a three-member government has to make judgments on
the following propositions:
a : Country X has weapons of mass destruction.
b : Action Y should be taken against country X.
b ↔ a : Action Y should be taken against country X if and only if country X has
weapons of mass destruction.
The judgments of the three government members are as shown in table 1, each
individually consistent.
a b ↔ a b
Individual 1 True True True
Individual 2 False False True
Individual 3 False True False
Majority False True True
Table 1
Then a majority rejects a (i.e. holds that country X does not have any weapons of
mass destruction); a majority accepts b ↔ a (i.e. holds that action Y should be taken
if and only if country X has such weapons); and yet a majority accepts b (i.e. holds
that action Y should be taken), an inconsistent set of collective judgments. Problems
of this kind are sometimes called ‘discursive dilemmas’ (Pettit 2001). Can we modify
propositionwise majority voting to avoid such problems?
This paper addresses a general class of judgment aggregation rules: quota rules.
Under a quota rule, a proposition is collectively accepted if and only if the number
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ernment, London School of Economics, London WC2A 2AE, U.K., c.list@lse.ac.uk.of individuals accepting it is greater than or equal to some threshold, which may
depend on the proposition in question. Propositionwise majority voting is a spe-
cial quota rule with a simple majority threshold for every proposition. Generally,
as propositions may diﬀer in status and importance, the threshold may vary from
proposition to proposition. In many real-world decision-making bodies, a higher ac-
ceptance threshold is required for more important propositions (e.g. constitutional
amendments or taking action Y against country X) than for less important ones (e.g.
ordinary legislation).
After characterizing the class of quota rules, we prove necessary and suﬃcient
conditions under which a quota rule guarantees ‘collective rationality’. We address
each of the rationality conditions of (weak and strong) consistency, deductive closure
and completeness. We show that the agenda of propositions under consideration
determines whether these conditions can be met. If the interconnections between the
propositions are above a certain complexity, no quota rule guarantees full ‘collective
rationality’.
So how can rational collective judgments be achieved? In the real world, groups of-
ten consider diﬀerent propositions not simultaneously, but sequentially, letting earlier
judgments constrain later ones. Under a sequential quota rule, a group considers dif-
ferent propositions in a sequence and takes a vote (applying the relevant acceptance
threshold) only on those propositions on which the judgments are not yet constrained
by earlier judgments.
Sequential quota rules guarantee collective consistency by design (and sometimes
completeness and deductive closure), but may be path-dependent: the order in which
the propositions are considered may aﬀect the outcome. We show that a sequential
quota rule is path-independent if and only if its corresponding ordinary quota rule is
collectively rational in an appropriate sense, which implies that path-independence
is a demanding condition.
Path-dependence matters for two reasons. First, path-dependent sequential rules
are obviously vulnerable to manipulation by changes of the decision-path. Second,
and less obviously, path-dependent sequential rules are also vulnerable to strategic
voting. We show that, under mild conditions, strategy-proofness of a sequential quota
rule is logically equivalent to its path-independence.
Our ﬁndings show that groups forming collective judgments on multiple propos-
itions may face a trade-oﬀ between democratic responsiveness, collective rationality
and strategy-proofness.
The problem of judgment aggregation was ﬁrst formalized by List and Pettit (2002,
2004), who also proved a ﬁrst impossibility theorem. Stronger impossibility results
were proved by Pauly and van Hees (2004), Dietrich (2004a/b), Gärdenfors (2004),
Nehring and Puppe (2004a) and van Hees (2004). List (2003), Dietrich (2004a) and
Pigozzi (2004) proved possibility results. Nehring and Puppe (2004b) investigated the
related framework of property spaces and proved a characterization of collective con-
sistency similar to the one given here; we extend their contribution by considering also
the other rationality conditions discussed in the literature, such as deductive closure,
and sequential aggregation rules. Path-dependence and strategy-proofness were ﬁrst
discussed in List (2004) and Dietrich and List (2004), but not with respect to quota
rules; we extend the latter contributions by fully characterizing path-(in)dependence
and strategy-proofness under sequential quota rules. All proofs are given in an ap-
pendix.
22 Judgment aggregation: the basic model
We consider a group of individuals N = {1,2,...,n} (n ≥ 2), which seeks to make
collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
2.1 The propositions under consideration
Propositions are represented in formal logic. For simplicity, we use standard pro-
positional logic, but our results are also true in more general logics.2 Here our pro-
positional language L contains atomic propositions without logical connectives and
non-atomic propositions with the logical connectives ¬ (not), ∧ (and), ∨ (or), → (im-
plies), ↔ (if and only if). Formally, L is the (smallest) set such that (i) L contains
the given atomic propositions a, b, c, ..., and (ii) whenever L contains two proposi-
tions p and q,t h e nL also contains ¬p, (p ∧ q), (p ∨ q), (p → q) and (p ↔ q).A sa
notational convention, we drop external brackets around propositions, e.g. instead of
((a ∧ b) → c) we write (a ∧ b) → c.
A truth-value assignment is a function assigning the value ‘true’ or ‘false’ to each
proposition in L, with standard properties.3 A set of propositions S ⊆ L is consistent
if there exists some truth-value assignment for which all propositions in S are true,
and inconsistent otherwise; S is minimal inconsistent if S is inconsistent, but every
proper subset of S is consistent. For example, {a ∧ b,¬a,¬b} is inconsistent and
{a ∧ b,¬a} is minimal inconsistent. A set S ⊆ L entails ap r o p o s i t i o np ∈ L if
S ∪ {¬p} is inconsistent.
The agenda is the set of propositions under consideration; it is a ﬁnite non-empty
subset X ⊆ L,w h e r e( i )X contains no double-negated propositions (¬¬p), (ii) X is
a union of proposition-negation pairs {p,¬p}, (iii) X does not contain any tautologies
(propositions true for every truth-value assignment) or contradictions (propositions
false for every truth-value assignment).
For simplicity, we introduce a modiﬁed negation operator ∼,w h e r e
∼ p :=
½
¬p if p is not the negation of some other proposition,
q if p = ¬q for some other proposition q.
In the example above, the agenda is X := {a,b,b ↔ a,∼ a,∼ b,∼ (b ↔ a)}.
2.2 Individual and collective judgment sets
Each individual i’s judgment set is a subset Ai ⊆ X,w h e r ep ∈ Ai means ‘indi-
vidual i accepts proposition p’. A proﬁle (of individual judgment sets) is an n-tuple
(A1,...,A n).
A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that maps each proﬁle (A1,...,A n)
in a given domain to a (collective) judgment set F(A1,...,A n)=A ⊆ X,w h e r e
p ∈ A means ‘the group accepts proposition p’.
We introduce several rationality conditions on a judgment set A (individual or
collective): (i) A is complete if it contains at least one member of each pair p,∼
2We can use any formal language L satisfying the minimal conditions (L1)-(L5) in Dietrich
(2004b). In addition to standard propositional logic as deﬁned above, this permits several more
expressive logics, including predicate calculi, modal logics and conditional logics.
3A truth-value assignment satisﬁes the following. For any p,q ∈ L, ¬p is true if and only if p is
false; p ∧ q is true if and only if both p and q are true; p ∨ q is true if and only if at least one of p or
q is true; p → q is true if and only if it is not the case that [p is true and q is false]; p ↔ q is true if
and only if p and q are both true or both false.
3p ∈ X;( i i )A is weakly consistent if it contains at most one member of each pair
p,∼ p ∈ X; (iii) A is consistent if there exists some truth-value assignment for which
all propositions in A a r et r u e( i . e .A is a consistent set); (iv) A is deductively closed
if, whenever a consistent subset B ⊆ A entails a proposition p ∈ X,t h e np ∈ X.
These rationality conditions are logically interrelated as follows.
Lemma 1 For any judgment set A,
(a) consistency implies weak consistency;
(b) given deductive closure, consistency is equivalent to weak consistency;
(c) given completeness, consistency is equivalent to the conjunction of weak con-
sistency and deductive closure.
A judgment set is fully rational if it is complete and consistent (hence also weakly
consistent and deductively closed, by lemma 1). We call the set of all possible proﬁles
of fully rational judgment sets the universal domain.
3 Quota rules and collective rationality
After deﬁning and characterizing the class of quota rules for judgment aggregation,
we prove necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which a quota rule satisﬁes various
collective rationality conditions and generalize earlier (im)possibility results.
3.1 Quota rules
Consider any family of thresholds (mp)p∈X such that, for each proposition p ∈ X,
mp ∈ {1,...,n}.Aquota rule is the aggregation rule F(mp)p∈X with universal domain
given by
F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n): = {p ∈ X : |{i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp}
for each proﬁle (A1,...,A n).
Informally, each proposition p ∈ X is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted
by at least mp individuals.
Aq u o t ar u l eF(mp)p∈X (= Fm)i suniform if the acceptance threshold takes the
same value mp = m for all p ∈ X. Examples of uniform quota rules are propos-
itionwise majority rule (where m = d(n +1 ) /2e,w i t hdxe deﬁned as the smallest
integer greater than or equal to x), propositionwise special majority rule (where
d(n +1 ) /2e <m<n )a n dpropositionwise unanimity rule (where m = n).
It is easy to characterize the class of quota rules using the following conditions.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the universal domain, i.e. the set of all
possible proﬁles of fully rational individual judgment sets.
Anonymity. For every two proﬁles (A1,...,A n), (Aπ(1),...,A π(n)) in the domain
of F,w h e r eπ : N 7→ N is any permutation of the individuals, F(A1,...,A n)=
F(Aπ(1),...,A π(n)).
Responsiveness. For every proposition p ∈ X,t h e r ee x i s ta tl e a s tt w op r o ﬁles
(A1,...,A n), (A∗
1,...,A ∗




4Independence. For every proposition p ∈ X and proﬁles (A1,...,A n), (A∗
1,...,A ∗
n)
in the domain of F, if [for all individuals i, p ∈ Ai if and only if p ∈ A∗
i], then
[p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) if and only if p ∈ F(A∗
1,...,A ∗
n)].
Two proﬁles are i-variants of each other if they coincide for all individuals except
possibly i.
Monotonicity. For every proposition p ∈ X, individual i, and pair of i-variants
(A1,...,A n), (A1,...,A 0
i,...,A n) in the domain of F with p/ ∈ Ai and p ∈ A0
i,i fp ∈
F(A1,...,A n) then p ∈ F(A1,...,A 0
i,...,A n).
Universal domain states that every possible proﬁle of fully rational individual
judgment sets is admissible. Anonymity requires giving equal consideration to all
individuals’ judgment sets. Responsiveness rules out that some proposition in the
agenda is never accepted or never rejected. Independence requires propositionwise
aggregation, i.e. the collective judgment on a proposition depends only on the indi-
viduals’ judgments on that proposition and not on their judgments on other propos-
itions. Monotonicity requires that an additional individual’s support for an accepted
proposition does not lead to the rejection of that proposition.
Proposition 1 An aggregation rule has universal domain, is anonymous, respons-
ive, independent and monotonic if and only if it is a quota rule F(mp)p∈X for some
family of thresholds (mp)p∈X.4
3.2 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for collective rationality
We began with the observation that propositionwise majority voting does not guar-
antee rational collective judgments. Quota rules generalize propositionwise majority
voting by allowing any family of thresholds (mp)p∈X instead of the same threshold
m = d(n +1 ) /2e for all propositions. Can we specify the thresholds such that the
corresponding quota rule guarantees collective rationality?
We call an aggregation rule complete (respectively: weakly consistent, consistent,
deductively closed and fully rational) if it generates, for every proﬁle in its domain,
a complete (respectively: weakly consistent, consistent, deductively closed and fully
rational) collective judgment set.
Theorem 1 Aq u o t ar u l eF(mp)p∈X is
(a) complete if and only if
mp + m∼p ≤ n +1for every pair p,∼ p ∈ X; (1)
(b) weakly consistent if and only if
mp + m∼p >nfor every pair p,∼ p ∈ X; (2)
(c) consistent if and only if
X
p∈Z
mp >n (|Z| − 1) for every minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X; (3)
4The result remains true if responsiveness is dropped and each mp ∈ {0,...,n +1 } (rather than
{1,...,n} ), permitting degenerate quota rules.
5(d) deductively closed if and only if
X
p∈Z\{q}
mp − m∼q ≥ n(|Z| − 2)
for every member q of every
minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X.
(4)
The inequalities in (2) are just the inequalities in (3) restricted to minimal incon-
sistent sets of the form Z = {p,∼ p} ⊆ X. Nehring and Puppe (2004a) have proved
a result similar to part (c) of theorem 1 using the ‘intersection property’, which we
brieﬂy discuss in our concluding remarks.
To see how strongly the consistency requirement restricts the thresholds (mp)p∈X,
note that the inequality in (3) is equivalent to 1
|Z|
P
p∈Z mp >n (1 − 1/|Z|).S ot h e
average threshold mp for the acceptance of p (averaging over p ∈ Z)m u s te x c e e d
n(1 − 1/|Z|), a value approaching n a st h es i z eo fam i n i m a li n c o n s i s t e n ts e tZ
increases.
By combining the inequalities in theorem 1, we obtain conditions under which a
quota rule satisﬁes more than one rationality condition.
Corollary 1 Aq u o t ar u l eF(mp)p∈X is
(a) complete and weakly consistent if and only if
mp + m∼p = n +1for every pair p,∼ p ∈ X;
(b) consistent and deductively closed if and only if
X
p∈Z\{q}
mp +m i n {mq,n+1− m∼q} >n (|Z| − 1)
for every member q of every
minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X;
(5)
(c) fully rational if and only if
mp + m∼p = n +1 for every pair p,∼ p ∈ X,a n d P
p∈Z mp >n (|Z| − 1) for every minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X. (6)
3.3 The special case of uniform quota rules
As noted above, an important special class of quota rules are the uniform ones,
where the acceptance threshold is the same for all propositions. Here the inequalities
characterizing consistency and deductive closure reduce to some simple conditions.
Corollary 2 Let z be the size of the largest minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X.
(a) Au n i f o r mq u o t ar u l eFm is consistent if and only if m>n −n/z.I np a r t i c u l a r ,
for n 6=2 ,4, propositionwise majority rule (where m = d(n +1 ) /2e)i sc o n s i s t e n ti f
and only if z ≤ 2;i fn =2 ,i ti sa l w a y sc o n s i s t e n t ;i fn =4 ,i ti sc o n s i s t e n ti fa n d
only if z ≤ 3.
(b) A uniform quota rule Fm is deductively closed if and only if m = n (i.e. Fm
is propositionwise unanimity rule) or z ≤ 2. In particular, if n ≥ 3, propositionwise
majority rule (where m = d(n +1 ) /2e) is deductively closed if and only if z ≤ 2;i f
n =2 , it is always deductively closed.
(c) A uniform quota rule Fm is consistent and deductively closed if and only if
m = n (i.e. it is propositionwise unanimity rule) or [z ≤ 2 and m>n / 2].
6Note that z indicates how complex the logical interconnections in the agenda are;
z ≤ 2 corresponds to an agenda without any non-trivial interconnections, i.e. without
any minimal inconsistent sets of more than two propositions. Propositionwise unan-
imity rule is always consistent and deductively closed, at the expense of signiﬁcant
incompleteness. By contrast, propositionwise special majority rule is consistent if
and only if the acceptance threshold for every proposition exceeds n(1 − 1/z),w h i c h
approaches 1 as z increases, and it is deductively closed only in the special case z ≤ 2.
Propositionwise majority rule (when n ≥ 3) is consistent and deductively closed only
in the special case z ≤ 2. These results generalize the ‘discursive dilemma’ with which
we began.
3.4 A general (im)possibility result
By combining theorem 1 and proposition 1, we can characterize the types of agendas
X for which there exist fully rational aggregation rules that satisfy the conditions
introduced in the previous section.
Corollary 3 An aggregation rule with universal domain is anonymous, responsive,
independent, monotonic and fully rational if and only if it is a quota rule F(mp)p∈X
satisfying (6) above. In particular, there exists an aggregation rule with these proper-
ties if and only if the system (6) admits a solution (mp)p∈X in {1,...,n}X.
This corollary can be seen as an impossibility result: the (in)equalities in (6) have
solutions only for special agendas with few logical connections between propositions.
3.5 An example
For the agenda X := {a,b,b ↔ a,∼ a,∼ b,∼ (b ↔ a)} from our initial example,
the minimal inconsistent subsets Z ⊆ X are {a,∼ a}, {b,∼ b}, {b ↔ a,∼ (b ↔ a)},
{a,∼ b,b ↔ a}, {∼ a,b,b ↔ a}, {a,b,∼ (b ↔ a)} and {∼ a,∼ b,∼ (b ↔ a)}.W e
show that there exists no fully rational quota rule for this agenda. Assume, for a
contradiction, that F(mp)p∈X is fully rational. Then, by part (c) of corollary 1,
ma + m∼a = mb + m∼b = mb↔a + m∼(b↔a) = n +1 ,( 7 )
ma + m∼b + mb↔a > 2n and m∼a + mb + mb↔a > 2n,( 8 )
ma + mb + m∼(b↔a) > 2n and m∼a + m∼b + m∼(b↔a) > 2n.( 9 )
By adding the two inequalities in (8),w eo b t a i nma+m∼a+mb+m∼b+2mb↔a > 4n.
By (7), n+1+n+1+2mb↔a > 4n, hence 2mb↔a > 2n−2,i . e .mb↔a = n. An analogous
argument for the two inequalities in (9) yields m∼(b↔a) = n.S omb↔a + m∼(b↔a) =
2n>n+1 , which violates (7).
But, for a slightly modiﬁed agenda, there is a fully rational quota rule. Replace
the biconditional b ↔ a (action should be taken if and only if country X has weapons)
by the simple conditional a → b (if country X has weapons, then action Y should
be taken). The new agenda is thus X := {a,b,a → b,∼ a,∼ b,∼ (a → b)}.T h e
minimal inconsistent sets Z ⊆ X are now {a,∼ a}, {b,∼ b}, {a → b,∼ (a → b)},
{∼ a,∼ (a → b)}, {b,∼ (a → b)} and {a,∼ b,a → b}. By part (c) of corollary 1,a
quota rule F(mp)p∈X is fully rational if and only if
ma + m∼a = mb + m∼b = ma→b + m∼(a→b) = n +1 ,
m∼a + m∼(a→b) >nand mb + m∼(a→b) >nand ma + m∼b + ma→b > 2n.
7By expressing each m∼p as n +1− mp, the three inequalities become
−ma+m∼(a→b) > −1 and −m∼b+m∼(a→b) > −1 and ma+m∼b−m∼(a→b) >n−1;
equivalently,
m∼(a→b) ≥ ma and m∼(a→b) ≥ m∼b and m∼(a→b) ≤ ma + m∼b +1 .
The only solution to these inequalities in {1,...,n}X is ma = m∼b = m∼(a→b) = n,i . e .
a unanimity threshold for each of a, ∼ b and ∼ (a → b) a n dat h r e s h o l do f1f o re a c ho f
∼ a, b and a → b. So, in our example, the proposition that country X has weapons of
mass destruction is accepted only if all individuals accept that proposition, whereas
the proposition that action Y should be taken and the proposition that weapons
require action are each accepted as soon as they are accepted by just one individual,
a questionable aggregation rule.
Further, for the original agenda and also the modiﬁed one, the size of the largest
minimal inconsistent set is z =3 , so by corollary 2 a uniform quota rule Fm is
consistent if and only if m>2
3n and deductively closed if and only if m = n.B y
implication, for both agendas, there exists no fully rational uniform quota rule.
3.6 The computational usefulness of the inequalities
In addition to providing new theoretical insights, the inequalities in theorem 1 and
its corollaries are computationally useful. First, suppose we wish to verify whether
a given quota rule F(mp)p∈X satisﬁes some rationality condition. Without theoretical
results, we would have to consider every proﬁle in the universal domain and determine
whether the collective judgment set for that proﬁle satisﬁes the required condition.
The number of such proﬁl e sg r o w se x p o n e n t i a l l yi nt h eg r o u ps i z en (of course, it also
depends on the structure of the agenda). By contrast, the number of inequalities in
each part of theorem 1 does not depend on n; it is determined only by the structure
of the agenda. So, by using our inequalities, verifying the rationality of a given quota
rule is computationally feasible even for large group sizes.
Second, suppose we wish to verify, for a given agenda and a given number of
individuals, whether there exists a fully rational quota rule. Even for a small n,t h i s
task is computationally hard. There are nk possible quota rules for n individuals and k
propositions, and, for each of these nk rules, we would have to consider every possible
proﬁle and check the rationality of the outcome under that proﬁle, where the number
of such proﬁles grows exponentially in n. But, if we use corollary 3, the problem
reduces to verifying whether the system of linear (in)qualities (6) admits a solution
(mp)p∈X in {1,...,n}X, a computationally feasible task; the simplex procedure can
be used.
4 Sequential quota rules and path-dependence
We have seen that, for agendas above a certain complexity, there exists no fully
rational quota rule. A group can solve this problem by making judgments on multiple
propositions sequentially, letting earlier judgments constrain later ones. We now
consider the class of sequential quota rules, which are always consistent, but may be
path-dependent. After formally deﬁning path-dependence, we prove necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for its avoidance. In the subsequent section, we address the
relation between path-dependence of a sequential quota rule and its manipulability
by strategic voting.
84.1 Sequential quota rules
A decision-path is a one-to-one function Ω : {1,2,...,k} → X,w i t hk = |X|,w h e r e
p1 := Ω(1), p2 := Ω(2),. . . ,pk := Ω(k) are the propositions considered ﬁrst, second,
..., last. The decision-path may reﬂect either the temporal order in which the propos-
itions come up or an order of priority among the propositions. When the propositions
are considered along a given decision-path, the group’s judgment on a new propos-
ition may be logically constrained by its judgments on earlier propositions. If so,
the group derives its judgment on the new proposition from those earlier judgments.
If not, the group takes a vote on the new proposition, applying a certain accept-
ance threshold. This generalizes the approach in List (2004) by allowing diﬀerent
acceptance thresholds for diﬀerent propositions.
For any decision-path Ω and any family of thresholds (mp)p∈X,asequential quota
rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is the aggregation rule with universal domain given as follows. For
each proﬁle (A1,...,A n),
FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,An): =Φk,





Φt−1 ∪ {pt} if Φt−1 entails pt or
·
Φt−1 ∪ {pt} is consistent and




with Φ0 := ∅.
Informally, for each t, Φt is the set of propositions accepted up to step t; pt is
accepted at step t if either past judgments require the acceptance of pt or [past
judgments are consistent with pt and the group votes the accept pt].
As before, a sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X (= FΩ,m)i suniform if the acceptance
threshold takes the same value mp = m for all p ∈ X. A sequential quota rule
is always consistent by design (hence also weakly consistent). Whether it is also
complete and deductively closed depends on the decision-path Ω and the family of
thresholds (mp)p∈X.5
4.2 An example
To illustrate that the outcome of a sequential quota rule may depend on the decision-
path, consider our ﬁrst example, where the agenda is X := {a, b, b ↔ a, ∼ a, ∼ b,
∼ (b ↔ a)} and there are three individuals with judgment sets A1 = {a, b ↔ a, b},
A2 = {∼ a, ∼ (b ↔ a),b } and A3 = {∼ a, b ↔ a, ∼ b}, as shown in table 1. Suppose
the group uses a sequential quota rule FΩ,m, with a simple majority threshold m =2
for every proposition p ∈ X. Consider two diﬀerent decision-paths, Ω1 and Ω2,a s
s h o w ni nt a b l e2 .
5Consider a (natural) decision-path in which each proposition p ∈ X and its negation ∼ p are
adjacent, i.e. ∼ p comes immediately before or after p, and suppose that the thresholds mp and
m∼p satisfy mp + m∼p ≤ n +1 , meaning that the corresponding quota rule F(mp)p∈X is complete.
Then the sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is complete (and hence deductively closed by consist-
ency). Informally, the reason is that, when the sequential decision process reaches a pair of adjacent
propositions p,∼ p, either the past judgments entail p or ∼ p, in which case p or ∼ p is accepted,
or the past judgments entail neither p nor ∼ p, in which case again p or ∼ p is accepted since the
relation mp + m∼p ≤ n +1ensures that the support for p or ∼ p exceeds the appropriate threshold.
9t 1 2 3 4 5 6
Ω1(t) a ∼ a b ↔ a ∼ (b ↔ a) b ∼ b
Ω2(t) b ∼ b b ↔ a ∼ (b ↔ a) a ∼ a
Table 2
It is easy to see that the decision-paths Ω1 and Ω2 lead to diﬀerent outcomes.
Under Ω1, ∼ a and b ↔ a are each accepted by a vote and ∼ b is accepted by
inference, resulting in the judgment set {∼ a,b ↔ a,∼ b}. In our example, the
government ﬁrst forms the view that country X has no weapons and that weapons
are the required justiﬁcation for action before deriving the view that no action should
be taken. Under Ω2, b and b ↔ a are each accepted by a vote and a is accepted by
inference, resulting in the judgment set {a,b ↔ a,b}. Here the government ﬁrst forms
the view that action should be taken and that weapons are the required justiﬁcation
for action before deriving the view that country X has weapons.
4.3 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for path-independence
Formally, a sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is path-dependent if there exist two
decision-paths Ω1 and Ω2,ap r o ﬁle (A1, ..., A n) and a proposition p ∈ X such
that
p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) and p/ ∈ FΩ2,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n),
and path-independent otherwise; FΩ,(mp)p∈X is strongly path-dependent if there exist
two decision-paths Ω1 and Ω2,ap r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n) and a proposition p ∈ X such
that
p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) and ∼ p ∈ FΩ2,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n),
and weakly path-independent otherwise. Strong path-dependence implies path-
dependence; path-independence implies weak path-independence.
When is a sequential quota rule path-dependent, when not? By combining a result
in List (2004) with theorem 1 above, we can answer this question.
Theorem 2 A sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is
(a) weakly path-independent if and only if the corresponding ordinary quota rule
F(mp)p∈X is consistent, i.e. if and only if (3) above holds;
(b) path-independent if and only if the corresponding ordinary quota rule F(mp)p∈X
is consistent and deductively closed, i.e. if and only if (5) above holds.
We can also address the special case of a uniform sequential quota rule, combining
theorem 2 and corollary 2.
Corollary 4 Let z be the size of the largest minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X.
(a) A uniform sequential quota rule FΩ,m is weakly path-independent if and only
if m>n− n/z. In particular, for n 6=2 ,4, a sequential majority rule (where m =
d(n +1 ) /2e) is weakly path-independent if and only if z ≤ 2;i fn =2 ,i ti sa l w a y s
weakly path-independent; if n =4 , it is weakly path-independent if and only if z ≤ 3.
(b) A uniform sequential quota rule FΩ,m is path-independent if and only if m = n
(i.e. it is a sequential unanimity rule) or [z ≤ 2 and m>n / 2].
Our example above illustrates this result: sequential majority voting is path-
dependent because we have z =3(with n =3 ), which violates z ≤ 2.
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Path-dependent sequential quota rules are obviously vulnerable to manipulation by
agenda setters who can inﬂuence the order in which the propositions are considered.
In our example, an agenda setter who cares about taking action Y will set the decision-
path Ω2, whereas one who cares about avoiding action Y will set the decision-path
Ω1. But path-dependent rules are also vulnerable to strategic voting, i.e. to the
misrepresentation of judgments by the individuals; speciﬁcally, under mild conditions,
we show that strategy-proofness is equivalent to path-independence. We also note
that ordinary quota rules are always strategy-proof, although their use is limited
given their rationality violations.
5.1 Strategy-proofness
We now assume that each individual has not only a judgment set, but also an un-
derlying preference relation — possibly only partial — over all possible judgment sets.
This assumption captures the idea that, in comparing diﬀerent collective judgment
sets as potential outcomes, individuals will prefer some judgment sets to others.
Formally, each individual i has a preference relation %i over all possible judgment
sets of the form A ⊆ X. We assume that preference relations are reﬂexive and
transitive (but not necessarily complete). We also require that %i is compatible with
individual i’s judgment set Ai as follows. We say that one judgment set, A, agrees
with another, A∗, on a proposition p ∈ X if either both or none of A and A∗ contains
p.N o w%i is compatible with Ai if the following holds: whenever two judgment sets
A and A∗ are such that [for all propositions p ∈ X,i fA∗ agrees with Ai on p,t h e ns o
does A], then A %i A∗. Informally, compatibility of %i with Ai requires that, if one
j u d g m e n ts e ti sa tl e a s ta sc l o s ea sa n o t h er to an individual’s own judgments on the
propositions, then the individual weakly prefers the ﬁrst judgment set to the second.
In particular, an individual most prefers his or her own judgment set.
Now we can deﬁne strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule F.
Strategy-proofness. For every proﬁle (A1,...,A n) in the domain of F,e v e r y
individual i and any preference relation %i compatible with Ai, F(A1,...,A n) %i
F(A1,...,A ∗
i,...,A n) for every i-variant (A1,...,A ∗
i,...,A n) in the domain of F.
Informally, strategy-proofness requires that, for every proﬁle, each individual
weakly prefers the collective judgment set that is obtained from expressing his or her
own judgment set truthfully to any collective judgment set that would be obtained
from misrepresenting his or her judgment set (where other individuals’ judgment sets
are held ﬁxed).
Proposition 2 (Dietrich and List 2004) An aggregation rule with universal domain
is strategy-proof if and only if it is independent and monotonic.
This proposition immediately implies that ordinary quota rules are strategy-proof,
as they are independent and monotonic by proposition 1. But, as we have seen, such
rules often generate rationality violations. Are sequential quota rules ever strategy-
proof?
115.2 An example
Consider again our example of the three-member government with judgments as
shown in table 1. Suppose the government uses a sequential majority rule with
decision-path Ω1 as shown in table 2. Assuming that all three government members
express their judgments truthfully, the decision-path Ω1 leads to the collective judg-
ment set {∼ a,b ↔ a,∼ b}, i.e. a decision not to take action Y against country
X, as shown above. But suppose individual 2 cares strongly about taking action Y,
i.e. the acceptance of proposition b. Speciﬁcally, the following preference relation is
compatible with individual 2’s judgment set A2:
{∼ a,∼ (b ↔ a),b}Â 2 {a,(b ↔ a),b}Â 2 {a,∼ (b ↔ a),∼ b}Â 2 {∼ a,b ↔ a,∼ b},
where Â2 is the strong component of %2.
If individual 2 strategically expresses the judgment set A∗
2 = {a, b ↔ a,b} instead
of his or her truthful judgment set A2 = {∼ a, ∼ (b ↔ a),b}, then sequential majority
voting leads to the collective judgment set {a,b ↔ a,b} instead of {∼ a,b ↔ a,∼ b},
where {a,b ↔ a,b}Â 2 {∼ a,b ↔ a,∼ b}. So, by pretending to believe that country
X has weapons and that weapons justify action, individual 2 can bring about the
preferred decision to take action Y against country X. Hence sequential majority rule
on the given agenda with decision-path Ω1 is not strategy-proof.
5.3 Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for strategy-proofness
To state necessary and suﬃcient conditions for strategy-proofness of a sequential
quota rule, we ﬁrst introduce a simple condition on the representation of such a rule.
Note that, for a ﬁxed decision-path Ω,t w od i ﬀerent families of thresholds (mp)p∈X
and (m∗
p)p∈X may yield the same aggregation rule (i.e. mapping from proﬁles to
collective judgments). Let X = {a,∼ a}, Ω(1) = a, Ω(2) =∼ a, ma = m∼a =
m∗
a =( n +1 ) /2 (with n odd) and m∗
∼a =1 .T h e r u l e s FΩ,(mp)p∈X and FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X
both accept a whenever a majority supports a,a n d∼ a whenever a majority supports
∼ a.T h i si so b v i o u sf o rFΩ,(mp)p∈X and holds for FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X because any submajority
acceptance of ∼ a at step 2 in the recursive decision process is overruled by the
majority acceptance of a at step 1. So FΩ,(mp)p∈X and FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X represent the same
aggregation rule, though FΩ,(mp)p∈X does so more transparently.
We say that mp is the eﬀective threshold for proposition p ∈ X under the aggreg-
ation rule F if, for all proﬁles (A1,...,A n) in the domain of F, p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) if
a n do n l yi f|{i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp. A sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is transparent
if, for any proposition p ∈ X, [if there exists an eﬀective threshold for p,t h e nmp
is this threshold]. Transparency is a weak requirement: every sequential quota rule
FΩ,(mp)p∈X can — if not yet transparent — be made transparent by adjusting some of
the thresholds.
Proposition 3 For every sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X, there exists a transparent
sequential quota rule FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X with the same decision-path Ω such that, for every




p)p∈X,d e ﬁne, for each p ∈ X, m∗
p to be the eﬀective threshold for p
if there exists such an eﬀective threshold and m∗
p = mp otherwise.
Now we can state the logical relation between strategy-proofness and
path-independence.
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FΩ,(mp)p∈X is strategy-proof if and only if it is path-independent.6
By combining theorem 3 with theorem 2 above, we can characterize strategy-
proofness in terms of our inequalities on the family of thresholds.
Corollary 5 A complete or deductively closed transparent sequential quota rule
FΩ,(mp)p∈X is strategy-proof if and only if (3) above holds.
Together with corollary 4 above, theorem 3 ﬁnally implies a result on sequential
majority and unanimity rules.
Corollary 6 Let z be the size of the largest minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X.
(a) If n is odd, a sequential majority rule FΩ,m (where m = d(n +1 ) /2e)i s
strategy-proof if and only if z ≤ 2.
(b) A sequential unanimity rule FΩ,m (where m = n) is always strategy-proof.
Our results show that strategy-proofness of sequential quota rule is a demanding
condition. Moreover, among the class of uniform sequential quota rules, a sequential
majority rule is strategy-proof only in the special case z ≤ 2; a sequential unanimity
rule is always strategy-proof, but again only at the expense of signiﬁcant incomplete-
ness.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
Before summarizing our ﬁndings, let us indicate an avenue for further generalization.
Quota rules are by deﬁnition anonymous. The non-anonymous generalization of a
quota rule is a committee rule. Here each proposition p ∈ X is endowed not with a
threshold mp but with a set Cp of winning coalitions C ⊆ N,w h e r eN ∈ Cp, ∅ / ∈ Cp,
and [if C ∈ Cp and C ⊆ C∗ ⊆ N,t h e nC∗ ∈ Cp]. For each family (Cp)p∈X of sets of
winning coalitions, a committee rule F(Cp)p∈X is the aggregation rule with universal
domain given by
F(Cp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)={p ∈ X : {i ∈ N : p ∈ Ai} ∈ Cp} for each proﬁle (A1,...,A n).
Nehring and Puppe’s ‘voting by committees’ (2004a,b) is a committee rule with the
additional property that [C ∈ Cp if and only if N\C/ ∈ C∼p]f o re a c hp ∈ X and each
C ⊆ N.
Can our results on collective rationality under quota rules be generalized to com-
mittee rules? Nehring and Puppe (2004a,b) have proved that ‘voting by committees’
is consistent if and only if the family (Cp)p∈X satisﬁes the ‘intersection property’.
Generally, the following can be shown in analogy to theorem 1 above, where part (c)
corresponds to Nehring and Puppe’s result. A committee rule F(Cp)p∈X is
(a) c o m p l e t ei fa n do n l yi f
C ∈ Cp or N\C ∈ C∼p for every pair p,∼ p ∈ X and coalition C;
6This result and corollary 5 also holds if, instead of requiring the sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X
to be complete or deductively closed, we require the corresponding ordinary quota rule F(mp)p∈X to
be complete or deductively closed.
13(b) weakly consistent if and only if
C/ ∈ Cp or N\C/ ∈ C∼p for every pair p,∼ p ∈ X and coalition C;




for every minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X
and coalitions Cp ∈ Cp,p ∈ Z;




for every minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X,
proposition q ∈ Z, and coalitions Cp ∈ Cp,p ∈ Z\{q}.
Using this generalization of theorem 1, our subsequent results can be generalized
to the non-anonymous case too.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings have clariﬁed the scope of rational judgment aggrega-
tion under ordinary and sequential quota rules. For each of the rationality conditions
of completeness, (weak and strong) consistency and deductive closure, we have shown
that a quota rule satisﬁes the given condition if and only if its family of acceptance
thresholds satisﬁes an appropriate system of inequalities. As full rationality is often
impossible to achieve under a quota rule, we have also considered sequential quota
rules. Such rules guarantee consistency (and sometimes also completeness and de-
ductive closure) but are path-dependent whenever the corresponding ordinary quota
rule exhibits certain rationality violations. Path-dependent sequential quota rules are,
in turn, vulnerable to various forms of strategic manipulation. So a group making
judgments on interconnected propositions — such as whether to take a certain action,
what counts as a justiﬁcation for that action and whether the justiﬁcation holds —
may have a hard time doing so in a way that is simultaneously democratic, rational
and strategy-proof.
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A Appendix
In the following we write S ² p as an abbreviation for ‘S entails p’. For each S ⊆ L,
we deﬁne S := {p ∈ L : S ² p}. For each judgment set A and each proposition p ∈ X,
we deﬁne A(p): =1if p ∈ A and A(p): =0if p/ ∈ A.
The proof of lemma 1 uses the following result.
Lemma 2 (List 2004) A set S ⊆ X is inconsistent if and only if there exist two
consistent subsets S1,S 2 ⊆ S a n dap r o p o s i t i o np ∈ X such that S1 entails p and S2
entails ∼ p.
Proof of lemma 1. Part (a) is trivial.
(b) Assume A ⊆ X is deductively closed. By part (a), consistency implies weak
consistency. Now assume A is not consistent. By lemma 2, there exist consistent sets
S1,S 2 ⊆ A and a proposition p ∈ X such that S1 ² p and S2 ²∼ p. By deductive
closure, p,∼ p ∈ A. Hence A is not weakly consistent.
(c) Assume A ⊆ X is complete. First, let A be consistent. By (a), A is weakly
consistent. To prove deductive closure, consider any p ∈ X such that A ² p.T h e n
A ∪ {∼ p} is inconsistent. So, since A is consistent, A 6= A ∪ {∼ p}.H e n c e∼ p/ ∈ A.
By completeness, p ∈ A. Conversely, suppose A is not consistent. We must show
that A is not weakly consistent or not deductively closed. By lemma 2, there exist
consistent sets S1,S 2 ⊆ A and a proposition p ∈ X such that S1 ² p and S2 ²∼ p.I f
A is deductively closed, then p,∼ p ∈ X, hence X violates deductive closure. ¥
Proof of proposition 1. It is easy to see that a quota rule F(mp)p∈X satisﬁes the
speciﬁed conditions. Conversely, assume that F satisﬁes the conditions. We show
that, for any p ∈ X, there exists a threshold mp ∈ {1,...,n} such that p is accepted if
and only if at least mp individuals accept p.C o n s i d e ra n yp ∈ X. By responsiveness,
there exists at least one proﬁle (A1,...,A n) such that p is accepted; among all such
proﬁles, choose one for which the number of individuals accepting p is minimal, and
call this number mp. By independence and anonymity, p is accepted for every proﬁle
with exactly mp individuals accepting p. Using monotonicity, it follows that p is
accepted in every proﬁle with at least mp individuals accepting p. On the other hand,
p is rejected in every proﬁle with less than mp individuals accepting p,b yd e ﬁnition of
mp. Since by responsiveness p is not always accepted, mp 6=0 . Hence mp ∈ {1,...,n}.
¥
15Proof of theorem 1. We denote F(mp)p∈X simply by F. Also, for each p ∈ X,l e t
np be the number of individuals i such that p ∈ Ai for a given proﬁle (A1,...,A n).
Note that, as the proﬁle ranges over the universal domain, for each pair p,∼ p ∈ X,
the pair of numbers (np,n ∼p) ranges over the set {(k,n− k):k =0 ,1,...,n}.
(a) F i sc o m p l e t ei fa n do n l yi f ,f o re a c hp a i rp,∼ p ∈ X, we have
for each proﬁle, if p is rejected then ∼ p is accepted,
equivalently, for each proﬁle, if np <m p then n∼p ≥ m∼p,
equivalently, for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n, if k<m p then n − k ≥ m∼p,
equivalently, if k = mp − 1 then n − k ≥ m∼p,
equivalently, mp + m∼p ≤ n +1 .
(b) F is weakly consistent if and only if, for each pair p,∼ p ∈ X, we have
for each proﬁle, if p is accepted then ∼ p is rejected,
equivalently, for each proﬁle, if np ≥ mp then n∼p <m ∼p,
equivalently, for each 0 ≤ k ≤ n,i fk ≥ mp then n − k<m ∼p,
equivalently, if k = mp then n − k<m ∼p,
equivalently, mp + m∼p >n .
(c) First, assume that F is not consistent. We show that at least one of the
inequalities is violated. By assumption, there exists a proﬁle (A1,...,A n) for which
F(A1,...,A n) is inconsistent. Let Z ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) be a minimal inconsistent set.
Since in the proﬁle (A1,...,A n) exactly n − np individuals reject each given p ∈ Z,
a rejection of some proposition in Z by some individual i occurs exactly
P
p∈Z(n −
np) times in (A1,...,A n). On the other hand, since Z is inconsistent, each of the n
individuals rejects at least one proposition in Z. So, a rejection of some proposition in
Z by some individual i occurs at least n times in (A1,...,A n). Hence
P
p∈Z(n−np) ≥
n. So, since for all p ∈ Z we have np ≥ mp (by p ∈ F(A1,...,A n)), it follows that
P
p∈Z(n − mp) ≥ n,
equivalently, n|Z| −
P
p∈Z mp ≥ n
equivalently,
P
p∈Z mp ≤ n(|Z| − 1).
(10)
This violates the inequality for Z.
Conversely, assume that there is some minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X with P
p∈Z mp ≤ n(|Z| − 1), hence by (10)
P
p∈Z(n − mp) ≥ n. We construct a proﬁle
(A1,...,A n) for which the group accepts each p ∈ Z, and hence generates an incon-
sistent judgment set. Since Z is minimal inconsistent, for each p ∈ Z the set Z\{p} is
consistent, and so Z\{p} may be extended to a (complete and consistent) judgment
set, denoted A∼p. By
P
p∈Z(n − mp) ≥ n, it is possible to assign to every individual
i exactly one proposition pi ∈ Z in such a way that each p ∈ Z is assigned to at most
n − mp individuals. Deﬁne Ai as A∼pi. For each p ∈ Z, at most n − mp individuals
do not accept p, hence at least mp individuals accept p. So p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) for each
p ∈ Z.
(d) First, assume that F is not deductively closed. We show that at least one of the
inequalities is violated. By assumption, there exists a proﬁle (A1,...,A n), a consistent
subset R ⊆ F(A1,...,A n) and a p∗ ∈ X such that R ² p∗ but p∗ / ∈ F(A1,...,A n).
Let S ⊆ R be minimal such that S ² p∗.W r i t i n g q for ∼ p∗,t h es e tZ := S ∪ {q}
is minimal inconsistent. Since in the proﬁle (A1,...,A n) exactly n − np individuals
reject each given p ∈ Z, a rejection of some proposition in Z by some individual i
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p∈Z(n − np) times in (A1,...,A n). On the other hand, since Z is
inconsistent, each of the n individuals rejects at least one proposition in Z,s ot h a t
a rejection of some proposition in Z by some individual i occurs at least n times
in (A1,...,A n). Hence
P
p∈Z(n − np) ≥ n, or
P
p∈Z\{q}(n − np)+( n − nq) ≥ n,o r P
p∈Z\{q}(n − np)+n∼q ≥ n.U s i n gt h a tn∼q <m ∼q (by ∼ q = p∗ / ∈ F(A1,...,A n))
and that, for all p ∈ Z\{q}, np ≥ mp (by p ∈ F(A1,...,A n)), it follows that
P
p∈Z\{q}(n − mp)+m∼q >n ,
equivalently, n|Z\{q}| −
P
p∈Z\{q} mp + m∼q >n ,
equivalently, n(|Z| − 1) −
P
p∈Z\{q} mp + m∼q >n
equivalently,
P
p∈Z\{q} mp − m∼q <n (|Z| − 2).
(11)
This violates the inequality for Z.
Conversely, assume there is a minimal inconsistent set Z ⊆ X a n da ne l e m e n tq ∈
Z such that
P
p∈Z\{q} mp−m∼q <n (|Z|−2), i.e. by (11)
P
p∈Z\{q}(n−mp)+m∼q >n .
We construct a proﬁle (A1,...,A n) for which each p ∈ Z\{q} but not ∼ q is accepted.
This is a violation of deductive closure because Z\{q} is consistent and entails ∼ q.






1) ≥ n. So it is possible to assign to every individual i exactly one proposition pi ∈ Z
in such a way that each p ∈ Z\{q} is assigned to at most n−mp individuals and q is
assigned to at most m∼q − 1 individuals. Let Ai be A∼pi. Then, for each p ∈ Z\{q},
at most n − mp individuals do not accept p, hence at least mp individuals accept p.
So p ∈ F(A1,...,A n) for each p ∈ Z\{p}. Moreover, at most m∼q − 1 individuals do
not accept q, i.e. accept ∼ q.S o∼ q/ ∈ F(A1,...,A n). ¥
Proof of corollary 1. Part (a) is trivial.
(b) Let Z be the set of minimal inconsistent sets Z ⊆ X. F(mp)p∈X is consistent
if and only if
P
p∈Z mp >n (|Z| − 1) for every Z ∈ Z,o re q u i v a l e n t l y
X
p∈Z\{q}
mp + mq >n (|Z| − 1)
for every member
q of every Z ∈ Z.
(12)
Further, F(mp)p∈X is deductively closed if and only if
P
p∈Z\{q} mp−m∼q ≥ n(|Z|−2)
for every member q of every Z ∈ Z, or equivalently
X
p∈Z\{q}
mp + n +1− m∼q >n (|Z| − 1)
for every member
q of every Z ∈ Z.
(13)
The claim follows from the fact that the conjunction of (12) and (13) is equivalent to
(5).
(c) F(mp)p∈X is fully rational if and only if it is (i) complete and weakly consistent,
and (ii) consistent; by part (a), (i) is equivalent to the equations in (6), and (ii) is
equivalent to the inequalities in (6). ¥
Proof of corollary 2. (a) By theorem 3, Fm is consistent if and only if, for all
minimal inconsistent Z ⊆ X, n(|Z| − 1) <
P
p∈Z m, i.e. n|Z| − n<|Z|m, i.e.
m>n−n/|Z|. The latter inequality holds for all minimal inconsistent Z ⊆ X just in
case m>n−n/z.L e tm = d(n +1 ) /2e.F i r s t ,a s s u m en is odd, hence m =( n+1)/2.
Then Fm is consistent if and only if (n +1 ) /2 >n− n/z, which is easily seen to be
17equivalent to z ≤ 2.N o wl e tn be even, hence m = n/2+1 .T h e nFm is consistent
if and only if n/2+1>n− n/z,i . e .n/z > n/2 − 1. This inequality always holds if
n =2 ;i fn =4 , it holds just in case z ≤ 3;i fn ≥ 6,i th o l d sj u s ti nc a s ez ≤ 2.
(b) By theorem 3,F m is deductively closed if and only if, for all minimal inconsist-
ent Z ⊆ X and any q ∈ Z,
P
p∈Z\{q} m−m ≥ n(|Z|−2),i . e .m(|Z|−2) ≥ n(|Z|−2),
i.e. m = n or |Z| ≤ 2. The latter inequality holds for all minimal inconsistent Z ⊆ X
just in case z ≤ 2. Now let m = d(n +1 ) /2e.F i r s t ,l e tn ≥ 3. Hence m 6= n.S oFm
is deductively closed if and only if z ≤ 3. Second, let n =2 .T h e nm = n.S oFm is
deductively closed.
(c) By parts (a) and (b), Fm is consistent and deductively closed if and only if
m>n− n/z and [z ≤ 2 or m = n], i.e. (i) [m>n− n/z and m = n]o r( i i )
[m>n− n/z and z ≤ 2]. Note that (i) is equivalent to m = n. Further, (ii) is
equivalent to [m>n / 2 and z ≤ 2]: if z ≤ 2,t h e nw eh a v ez =2(because z 6=1 , as
X contains no contradictions), and hence n − n/z = n/2. ¥
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y3. The result follows immediately from theorem 1 and propos-
ition 1. ¥
Given theorem 1 and corollary 2, only the following equivalence remains to be
s h o w ni no r d e rt op r o v et h e o r e m2 .
Proposition 4 A sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X is
(a) weakly path-independent if and only if the corresponding quota rule F(mp)p∈X
is consistent;
(b) path-independent if and only if the corresponding quota rule F(mp)p∈X is con-
sistent and deductively closed.
The proof of proposition 4 relies on two lemmas.
Lemma 3 For every sequential rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X,p r o ﬁle (A1,...,A n),a n ds t e pt ∈
{0,...,k}, we have Φt ⊆ Φt ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) (where Φt is as in the deﬁnition
of FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)).
Proof of lemma 3. Consider any family (mp)p∈X and proﬁle (A1,...,A n). We
prove Φt ⊆ Φt ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) by induction on t ∈ {0,...,k}.
If t =0 , the claim follows from Φ0 = ∅.
Now let t>0 and assume Φt−1 ⊆ Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).I fpt / ∈ Φt, then
Φt = Φt−1; hence the claim holds by induction hypothesis.
Now suppose pt ∈ Φt.T h e nΦt = Φt−1∪{pt}.S oΦt ⊆ Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)
∪ {pt} by induction hypothesis. Hence it is suﬃcient to prove that
Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) ∪ {pt} ⊆ Φt ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).
Since Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) ⊆ Φt ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) (by Φt−1 ⊆ Φt), it
is suﬃcient to show that pt ∈ Φt ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).B ypt ∈ Φt, there are two
cases: (i) Φt−1 ² pt,o r( i i )pt ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). Under case (ii), the claim is
trivial. Under case (i), the induction hypothesis implies Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) ²
pt; hence pt ∈ Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n), as required. ¥
Lemma 4 Let (mp)p∈X be given. For any proﬁle (A1,...,A n) and any proposition
p ∈ X, [some consistent subset S ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) entails p]i fa n do n l yi f
[p ∈ FΩ,(mp)p∈X (A1,...,A n) for some decision-path Ω].
18Proof of lemma 4. Consider any proﬁle (A1,...,A n) and proposition p ∈ X.
First, let there exist a decision-path Ω with p ∈ FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).L e t
Φ0,...,Φk (k = |X|) be as in the deﬁnition of FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n), and t ∈
{1,2,...,k} be such that p = pt.B yp ∈ FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) we have p ∈ Φt.S o
there are only two possible cases: (i) Φt−1 ² p or (ii)
·
Φt−1 ∪ {p} is consistent and
|{i ∈ 1,2,...,n: p ∈ Ai}| ≥ mp
¸
.
In case (i), we put S := Φt−1 ∩ F(mp)p∈X(A1, ..., A n), which is consistent; since
Φt−1 ² p and since Φt−1 ⊆ S by lemma 3,w eh a v eS ² p, hence S ² p.I nc a s e( i i ) ,
we put S := {p}, which is again consistent and entails p.
Conversely, assume that S ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) is consistent and entails p.L e t
Ω be a decision-path that begins with the propositions in S,f o l l o w e db yp r o p o s i t i o np,
followed by all other propositions; speciﬁcally, Ω(m)=pm ∈ S for all m =1 ,...,s=
|S|,a n dΩ(s +1 )=p. Let the sets Φ0,...,Φk (k = |X|) be as in the deﬁnition
of FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). We show by induction that Φm = {p1,...,p m} for each
m =1 ,...,s.
If m =1 , then Φ1 = {p1} since p1 ∈ FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).
Now let 1 <m≤ s and assume that Φm−1 = {p1,...,p m−1}. Since Φm−1∪{pm} =
{p1,...,p m} ⊆ S, Φm−1 ∪ {pm} is consistent. So, as pm ∈ FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n),w e
have Φm = Φm−1 ∪ {pm} = {p1,...,p m}, as desired.
In particular, Φs = {p1,...,p s} = S. By S ² p, we have p ∈ Φs+1,s op ∈
FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4. (a) First, suppose FΩ,(mp)p∈X is not weakly path-
independent, i.e. strongly path-dependent. Then there exist a proﬁle (A1,...,A n),a
proposition p ∈ X and two decision-paths Ω1 and Ω2 such that
p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) and ∼ p ∈ FΩ2,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).
So, by lemma 4, there exists a consistent set S1 ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) that entails
p, and a consistent set S2 ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) that entails ∼ p. Hence, by lemma
2, F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) is inconsistent, i.e. F(mp)p∈X is not consistent.
Conversely, suppose F(mp)p∈X is not consistent. Consider any proﬁle (A1,...,A n)
for which F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) is inconsistent. By lemma 2, there exist two consistent
subsets S1,S 2 ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) such that S1 ² p and S2 ²∼ p. Hence, by
lemma 4, there exist decision-path Ω1 and Ω2 such that p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)
and ∼ p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).S oFΩ,(mp)p∈X is not weakly path-independent.
(b) First, suppose F(mp)p∈X is consistent and deductively closed. We show
that, for every decision-path Ω1 and proﬁle (A1,...,A n),F Ω1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)
= F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n), which implies path-independence. Consider any Ω1 and
(A1,...,A n). Let the sets Φ0,. . . ,Φk and propositions p1,. . . ,p k (k = |X|)
be as in the deﬁnition of FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). We show by induction that
Φt = F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)∩{p1,...,p t} for all t ∈ {0,...,k};t h ec a s et = k then yields
our claim.
For t =0 , the claim is trivial by Φ0 = ∅.
Now let 0 <t≤ k and assume Φt−1 = F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) ∩ {p1,...,p t−1}.W e
have to show that pt ∈ Φt is equivalent to pt ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). First, as-
sume pt ∈ Φt. Then, by deﬁnition of Φt,e i t h e r( i )Φt−1 ² pt or (ii) [Φt−1 ∪ {pt}
is consistent and pt ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)]. In case (ii), we obviously have pt ∈
F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).I nc a s e( i ) ,w eh a v eF(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)∩{p1,...,p t−1} ² pt by
induction hypothesis; since F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) ∩ {p1,...,p t−1} is consistent by the
19consistency of F(mp)p∈X,w eh a v ept ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) by the deductive closure
of F(mp)p∈X. Now assume that pt ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). By induction hypothesis,
Φt−1 ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). Hence, Φt−1 ∪ {pt} ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n).S o ,b yt h e
consistency of F(mp)p∈X, Φt−1∪{pt} is consistent. Hence, as pt ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n),
we have pt ∈ Φt by deﬁnition of Φt.
Conversely, suppose F(mp)p∈X is not consistent or not deductively closed. If
F(mp)p∈X is not consistent, then the result follows from part (a). Suppose now
F(mp)p∈X is consistent, but not deductively closed. Then there is a proﬁle (A1, ...,
An), a consistent set S ⊆ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) and a proposition p ∈ X such that
S ² p and p/ ∈ F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n). So, on the one hand, by lemma 4,t h e r ee x i s t s
a decision-path Ω1 such that p ∈ FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n), and, on the other hand,
p/ ∈ FΩ2,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n) for any decision-path Ω2 with Ω2(1) = p.T h i si m p l i e s
path-dependence. ¥
P r o o fo ft h e o r e m2. Given theorem 1 and corollary 2, the result follows from
proposition 4. ¥
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3. Consider any sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X.F o re a c h
p ∈ X, deﬁne the new threshold m∗
p as the eﬀective threshold for p if p has an eﬀective
threshold, and as mp otherwise.
Claim 1: FΩ,(mp)p∈X and FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X generate the same judgment sets. Consider
any proﬁle (A1,...,A n) ∈ An. Let the sets Φt (t =0 ,...,k, k = |X|)b ea sg i v e ni n
the deﬁnition of FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n),a n dl e tΦ∗
t (t =0 ,...,k) be the corresponding
sets for FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X(A1,...,A n). By a straightforward induction on t, we have Φt = Φ∗
t
for all t. In particular, Φk = Φ∗
k, i.e. FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)=FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X(A1,...,A n).
Claim 2: FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X is transparent. Consider any proposition p ∈ X, and assume
p has an eﬀective threshold under FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X.B y c l a i m 1 ,p has the same eﬀective
threshold under FΩ,(mp)p∈X.S o , b y d e ﬁnition of m∗
p, p has eﬀective threshold m∗
p
under FΩ,(mp)p∈X. So, by claim 1, p has eﬀective threshold m∗
p under FΩ,(m∗
p)p∈X. ¥
The proof of theorem 3 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5 For every sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X,
(a) path-independence implies FΩ,(mp)p∈X = F(mp)p∈X;
(b) the converse also holds in case FΩ,(mp)p∈X or F(mp)p∈X is complete or deduct-
ively closed.
P r o o fo fl e m m a5.( a )L e tFΩ,(mp)p∈X be path-independent. Consider any proﬁle
(A1,...,A n) and proposition p ∈ X. We have to show that FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)(p)=
F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)(p).L e t Ω1 be some decision-path with Ω1(1) = p. Then,
by path-independence, FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)(p)=FΩ1,(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)(p),w h i c h
equals F(mp)p∈X(A1,...,A n)(p) by deﬁnition of Ω1.
(b) Now let FΩ,(mp)p∈X = F(mp)p∈X, and assume this aggregation rule is complete
or deductively closed. If it is deductively closed, then, as it is also consistent (by
deﬁnition of sequential rules), it is path-independent by proposition 4 (b). If it is
complete, then, as it is also consistent, it is deductively closed by lemma 1; hence it
is again path-independent by proposition 4 (b). ¥
Proof of theorem 3. Consider any complete or deductively closed transparent
sequential quota rule FΩ,(mp)p∈X.
201. First, assume FΩ,(mp)p∈X is path-independent. By lemma 5,F Ω,(mp)p∈X =
F(mp)p∈X.S oFΩ,(mp)p∈X is independent and monotonic, hence strategy-proof by pro-
position 2.
2. Now assume FΩ,(mp)p∈X is strategy-proof. Then FΩ,(mp)p∈X is independent and
monotonic by proposition 2.S o , s i n c e FΩ,(mp)p∈X is also anonymous, there exists a
family (m∗
p)p∈X ∈ {0,...,n+1 }X such that FΩ,(mp)p∈X = F(m∗
p)p∈X,w h e r eF(m∗
p)p∈X
denotes the obvious generalisation of our deﬁnition of quota rules to the case where
each m∗
p can also be 0 or n +1(in which case p is always or never accepted).
Claim 1: For each p ∈ X, m∗
p ≤ n.
Consider any p ∈ X.L e t A be a (complete and consistent) judgment set such
that p ∈ A. Let the propositions pt and the sets Φt (t =0 ,...,k, k = |X|)b ea s
in the deﬁnition of FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A,...,A).N o t e t h a t F(mp)p∈X(A,...,A)=A (since
1 ≤ mp ≤ n for all p ∈ X). By a straightforward induction, it follows that Φt =
A ∩ {p1,...,p t} for all t ∈ {0,...,k}.I n p a r t i c u l a r , Φk = A ∩ {p1,...,p k} = A, i.e.
FΩ,(mp)p∈X(A,...,A)=A.S o ,b yFΩ,(mp)p∈X = F(m∗
p)p∈X, F(m∗
p)p∈X(A,...,A)=A.I n
particular, p ∈ F(m∗
p)p∈X(A,...,A), hence m∗
p ≤ n.
Claim 2: For each p ∈ X, m∗
p ≥ 1.
Consider any p ∈ X.L e tA be a (complete and consistent) judgment set such that





By the claims 1 and 2, each m∗
p belongs to {1,...,n},i . e . i sat h r e s h o l di no u r
standard sense, which will allow us to use a transparency argument. By FΩ,(mp)p∈X =
F(m∗
p)p∈X,e a c hp ∈ X has eﬀective threshold m∗
p. So, by transparency, mp = m∗
p
for each p ∈ X. Hence FΩ,(mp)p∈X = F(mp)p∈X.S o , b y l e m m a 5 (b), FΩ,(mp)p∈X is
path-independent. ¥
Proof of corollary 6.( a ) L e t n be odd and consider a sequential majority rule
FΩ,m (m =( n+1)/2). To apply theorem 3 to FΩ,m,i ti ss u ﬃcient to show that FΩ,m
is transparent and that Fm is complete (see footnote 6). As n is odd, Fm is complete.
To prove that FΩ,m is transparent, consider any p ∈ X and let there be an eﬀective
threshold mp for p. We show that mp = m by proving ﬁrst that mp ≤ m and then
that mp >m− 1.L e tAp and A∼p be (complete and consistent) judgment sets with
p ∈ Ap and p/ ∈ A∼p.
mp ≤ m:L e t (A1,...,A n) be a proﬁle in which exactly m individuals i have
Ai = Ap and the other n − m = m − 1 individuals i have Ai = A∼p.L e t t h e
propositions p1,...,p k and the sets Φ0,...,Φk (k = |X|)b ea si nt h er e c u r s i v ed e ﬁnition
of FΩ,m(A1,...,A n). By a straightforward induction that uses the fact that a majority
submits the judgment set Ap,w eh a v eΦt = Ap ∩ {p1,...,p t} for all t ∈ {0,...,k}.I n
particular, Φk = Ap ∩ {p1,...,p k} = Ap, i.e. FΩ,m(A1,...,A n)=Ap. Hence p ∈
FΩ,m(A1,...,A n).T h i si m p l i e smp ≤ m, as mp is the eﬀective threshold for p and m
individuals accept p in (A1,...,A n).
mp >m− 1:N o w l e t (A1,...,A n) be a proﬁle in which exactly m individuals
i have Ai = A∼p and the other n − m = m − 1 individuals i have Ai = Ap.B y
an argument analogous to the above one, we have FΩ,m(A1,...,A n)=A∼p.H e n c e
p/ ∈ FΩ,m(A1,...,A n).T h i si m p l i e smp >m− 1, as mp is the eﬀective threshold for p
and m − 1 individuals accept p in (A1,...,A n).
Having shown transparency, by theorem 3 strategy-proofness is equivalent to path-
independence, which is equivalent to z ≤ 2 by corollary 4.
(b) Now consider a sequential unanimity rule FΩ,m (m = n). By corollary 2, FΩ,m
21is deductively closed. To apply theorem 3, we need to show that FΩ,m is transparent.
Consider any p ∈ X and let there be an eﬀective threshold mp for p. We show that
mp = m, i.e. that mp = n. As in part (a), let Ap and A∼p be (complete and
consistent) judgment sets with p ∈ Ap and p/ ∈ A∼p.L e t (A1,...,A n) be a proﬁle
in which one individual i has Ai = A∼p and n − 1 individuals i have Ai = Ap.L e t
the propositions p1,...,p k and the sets Φ0,...,Φk (k = |X|)b ea si nt h ed e ﬁnition of
FΩ,m(A1,...,A n). By a straightforward induction, we have Φt = Ap∩A∼p∩{p1,...,p t}
for all t ∈ {0,...,k}. In particular, Φk = Ap ∩ A∼p ∩ {p1,...,p k} = Ap ∩ A∼p, i.e.
FΩ,m(A1,...,A n)=Ap ∩ A∼p. Hence p/ ∈ FΩ,m(A1,...,A n).T h i si m p l i e smp >n− 1,
as mp is the eﬀective threshold for p and n − 1 individuals accept p in (A1,...,A n).
So mp = n. This proves transparency.
Now by theorem 3 strategy-proofness is equivalent to path-independence, which
is satisﬁed by corollary 4. ¥
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